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Non-technical Summary
Google was involved in a series of deals, all of them related to the online
advertising industry: two mergers with YouTube and DoubleClick and one
arrangement with Yahoo!. Scholars in competition policy question the legit-
imacy of some of these deals (Chin (2006)). I review the basis of this purely
negative view and provide arguments that possibly would have underpinned
an efficiency defense. In particular, I advocate an increased incentive for the
customization of services and content as a beneficial effect, even if resulting
from a concentration process. A concentration may be beneficial on markets
based on multi-sided platforms (Evans (2002)). However, this cannot serve
as a per se ex post justification of the concentrations. In the model I consider
the quality of matches between users and advertisers a beneficial effect for
consumers, and the ability and incentive of a platform to control this quality,
which I incorporate in the model, is crucial for a concentration’s assessment.
I demonstrate that the merger between Google and YouTube can have
beneficial effects for consumers because the match between consumers and
advertising can be enhanced. This relies on the presumption that consumers
benefit more from having specific search ads displayed on websites than hav-
ing unspecific advertisement. Assuming that the degree of screening and
classifying of the users is subject to Google’s discretion, the merger mitigates
the incentive to not use its search technology to the full extent. After the
merger Google can better identify users of YouTube and match them with
ads specifically designed for users of user generated content. The acquisition
of DoubleClick endows Google with control over the search ad technology.
Leaving aside concerns on consumer privacy, I identify positive effects from
an enhanced searching and screening technology. Further, this allows to
make advancements in the screening technology. This becomes particularly
effective when Google is able to combine this technology with more detailed
information about the users’ geography, demography, and surfing habits on
the internet. The withdrawn arrangement between Google and Yahoo! was
double-edged. On the one hand, focusing on the advertising market, which is
immediately affected by this deal, there is a negative effect. The advertisers
face fewer suppliers of ad space on websites visited by users of search engines.
However, this comes along with an efficient allocation of ad space. On the
other hand, consumers benefit from the platform’s ability to fully employ its
search technology and display more accurate ads to the needs of the users.
Zusammenfassung
Google war an wettbewerbsrechtlich relevanten Vereinbarungen in der Online-
Werbebranche beteiligt: Zwei Fa¨lle mit YouTube und DoubleClick und eine
Vereinbarung mit Yahoo!. Wettbewerbsrechtler haben die Rechtma¨ßigkeit
einiger Vereinbarungen angezweifelt (Chin (2006)). Die U¨berpru¨fung dieser
negativen Bewertung liefert Argumente, die eine so genannte Efficiency De-
fense untermauern ko¨nnten. Insbesondere ist der Anreiz zu sta¨rker auf die
individuellen Nutzer ausgerichteten Werbeanzeigen und Dienstleistungen po-
sitiv zu bewerten, auch wenn sie aus einer versta¨rkten Marktkonzentration
resultieren. Dennoch ist dies keine ex post Legitimation des Konzentra-
tionsprozesses, obwohl eine vollsta¨ndige Monopolisierung bei mehrseitigen
Ma¨rkten (Platformen) optimal sein kann (Evans (2002)). Das Modell un-
tersucht den Anreiz einer Platform, verschiedene Kundengruppen zu identi-
fizieren. Dies ist eine Voraussetzung damit die U¨bereinstimmung zwischen
der Zielgruppe einer Anzeige und dem Nutzer verbessert werden kann.
Diese Untersuchung zeigt, dass der Zusammenschluss von Google und
YouTube positive Effekte fu¨r die Konsumenten haben kann, wenn die Wer-
bung besser auf die Interessen der Nutzer abgestimmt wird. Dies basiert auf
der Annahme, dass eine bessere Abstimmung auf die Konsumenten bevorzugt
wird. Wenn der Grad der U¨bereinstimmung von Google bestimmt werden
kann, reduziert der Zusammenschluss den Anreiz der Platform, die techni-
schen Mo¨glichkeiten der Selektionstechnologie nicht voll auszunutzen. Nach
dem Zusammenschluss kann Google die Nutzer von YouTube besser identi-
fizieren und sie mit den auf sie ausgerichteten Anzeigen verbinden. Durch die
Akquisition von DoubleClick erlangt Google die Kontrolle fu¨r die Selektions-
technologie. Ungeachtet der Befu¨rchtungen um den Datenschutz, sind der
effektivere Einsatz dieser Technolgie und die Mo¨glichkeiten sie fortzuentwick-
eln positiv. Insbesondere gilt dies, wenn Google in der Lage ist den Selek-
tionsmechanismums mit detaillierteren geographischen und demographischen
Informationen oder das Suchverhalten der Nutzer im Internet zu verbinden.
Die zuru¨ck genommene Vereinbarung mit Yahoo! hat einerseits negative
Effekte auf dem Werbemarkt, weil Anzeigen nunmehr u¨ber weniger Platfor-
men geschaltet werden ko¨nnen. Dennoch ist die Allokation von Anzeigen auf
die Werbefla¨chen effizient. Andererseits profitieren Nutzer davon, wenn die
Suchtechnologie in seiner vollen Bandbreite zum Einsatz kommt und somit
besser auf den Nutzer abgestimmte Werbeanzeigen gezeigt werden.
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consumer welfare. Consumers are affected by being on one side of a
multisided platform. Provided that better matches of search ads are
beneficial, I demonstrate that the mergers may have positive effects
for consumers through better matches between users and search ads.
However, this does not substitute an in-depth antitrust assessment of
the deals.
Keywords: merger control, multisided platforms, screening mechanism
JEL: L41, L42, K21, M37
∗ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, P.O.Box 10 34 43,
68034 Mannheim, Germany, tel. +49-(0)621-1235-175, fax. +49-(0)621-1235-170,
beschorner@zew.de. This paper was written while I was a visiting researcher at U.C.
Berkeley. I thank the Department of Economics and Prof. Bronwyn Hall for their hospi-
tality. Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR15
and RNIC Research Network on Innovation and Competition is gratefully acknowledged.
21 Introduction
In the present analysis I review three recent deals by Google: mergers or other
arrangements. Google is active in several fields of internet services. The most
prominent ones, where Google holds a significant market share, are internet
advertising, internet search services, and e-mail services. Google generates
its revenues mainly from internet advertising. Thereby they employ search-
based advertising, also known as search ads or behavioral advertising, which
consist of matching ad displays with particularly selected users, which have
proven likely to be interested in the advertised service or product. The rele-
vant information for the selection process stems from the users’ past behavior
that is recorded when navigating the internet. In recent times, Google’s ac-
tivities in generating and providing content became manifest. Oddly enough,
antitrust authorities are reluctant in expressing potential concerns about the
concentrations in which Google is involved. For example, the FTC does not
even have a press release on the $1.65 billion acquisition of YouTube on its
website. Possibly, this reservation stems from the recent defeat of DOJ in its
attempted blocking of Oracle’s acquisition of PeopleSoft.1
Scholars in antitrust law cast doubts about the legitimacy of Google’s
M&A strategy. Andrew Chins’s and Jay Kesan’s blog at www.voiceless.com:
”[...]I can’t think of any procompetitive efficiencies that could be attributed
to the merger.”2 reflects their presumption that in a thorough assessment of
the merger an efficiency defence would not hold. I further review Google’s
acquisition of DoubleClick, which is a provider of search advertising tech-
nology, and the arrangement between Google and Yahoo! in which Google
is providing the search ads which are displayed on Yahoo!’s website. The
welfare standard in U.S. antitrust policy is consumer welfare. Therefore, a
concentration can be beneficial if it augments monopolization as long as con-
sumers benefit. This is possibly the case in markets involving platforms.3 In
1See Sidak and Singer (2008).
2http://voiceless.com/index.php?p=96&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1#more96
(October 31, 2008).
3See Evans (2008).
3the following I focus of the effects on consumers surplus when assessing the
three cases.
I demonstrate that the mergers may have generated efficiency gains that
benefit consumers. These consist of ads and services that better fit the users’
interests and preferences. However, this finding does not substitute an in-
depth assessment of the deals, in particular when ”the effect of such acqui-
sition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly”4 such that an investigation would be advisable. This holds even
more as ”Section 7 does not require proof that a merger or other acquisition
[will] cause higher prices in the affected market. All that is necessary is that
the merger create an appreciable danger of such consequences in the future.”5
In particular, the present results cannot be considered as an ex post efficiency
defense or as a but for rationalization, had one of the mergers been challenged
by the FTC. Moreover, in its 2007 report the Antitrust Modernization Com-
mission has stressed that there shall be no exemption for mergers involving
new technologies where it is difficult to identify the relevant market because
there may be no historic demand substitution.6
With respect to the three deals, I show that the merger with YouTube
directs the advertisers’ incentives to providing more suitable ads. By the ac-
quisition of DoubleClick Google gains control over the core technology that
is employed in search advertising. Here, the main concern of the merger’s
opponents focuses on the users’ privacy rather than antitrust issues. Notwith-
standing, this allows to produce better matches between users and advertis-
ers. Finally, the arrangement with Yahoo! would have allowed Google to
fully exploit its search technology. This deal has been ended by Google be-
fore becoming effective because in negotiations and discussions Google was
unable to waive government regulator’s and advertisers’ concerns. In order
to avoid a legal dispute Google ended the agreement.7
4Clayton Act §7, 15 U.S.C. §18.
5Sidak and Singer (2008) quoting Judge Posner in Hospital Corp of America v. FTC,
807 F.2d 1381, 1389 [7th Cir. 1986].
6See Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007).
7See Schonfeld (2008).
4The structure of the paper is as follows: I give a brief review of the
literature on multisided platforms, the related advertising business and the
cases in section 2 before I present the model in section 3. Sections 4 through
6 analyze the mergers with YouTube, DoubleClick and the arrangement with
Yahoo!, respectively. In section 7, I give a summary of the results and a
conclusion.
2 Google’s Acquisitions, Agreements, and Re-
lated Work
The consideration of multisided platforms as particular form or market place
has become prominent through seminal papers by Rochet and Tirole (2003)
and Evans (2002). Platforms coordinate transactions between two or more
distinct group of customers which need each other in some way and which
would not interact absent the platform because of transaction costs.8 Thereby,
the profit maximizing price for one side may be below marginal cost for sup-
plying this side or it may even be negative. Examples are newspapers with
advertisers and readers (Dewenter and Kaiser (2006)), shopping centers with
shops and buyers (Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2007)), television with advertisers
and viewers, credit cards with shops and buyers (Gabszewicz and Wauthy
(2004)), or booking systems for hotels or flight connections (Ordover (2007)).
Google serves as a platform that brings together advertisers and users
(eyeballs). Advertisers benefit from the possibility of reaching many users
and the users receive advertising on products they may be interested in. In
newspapers the advertisers will target all readers uniformly and all readers
will receive the same advertisements. The advertising technology employed
by Google and other websites is much more sophisticated by offering search
ads. Evans (2008) provides a detailed description of the history of advertising
and of the online advertising industry. Users of the search engine unveil
their interest for particular products when they search for them on Google.
8See Evans (2002), Evans and Noel (2008), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006)
5Typically, users conduct searches on only one search site, mostly Google.
Similarly, small and medium firms tend to place their advertisements only
on Google.9
Further, browser technology allows to trace what other websites the user
has visited before and the IP address provides geographic information. On
the other hand, advertisers indicate keywords which fit to the content of
their ad. Search ad technology, which is offered by DoubleClick, allows to
match users and ad displays such the the ads are displayed to users who
are more likely to click on the ad. Like in Evans (2008) I presume that
search ads, which meet the users interest, are more beneficial than anonymous
advertising. Organizing a platform in a way that allows the advertisers to
place more targeted ads thus benefits consumers. Presuming that Google
does not manipulate its original search results or starts charging a price to
its users, it is sensible to assume that users unambiguously benefit from search
advertising. This is an externality from the advertising side of the platform
on the user side, for which there is no compensation. This is considered as a
positive non-internalized externality (Evans and Schmalensee (2008)).
The allocation of the advertisers and the ad space on the website is done
through auctions. The mechanism is a generalized second-price auction. I will
give an abbreviated and stylized description. For a through presentation of
the mechanism I refer to Edelman et al. (2007). An advertiser bids for having
his ad displayed to a user who sends a query for a particular keyword. Ad
space is limited and there may be several advertisers targeting for a particular
keyword. The ad with the highest bid is then displayed. The mechanism is
becoming more complicated as advertisers limit the amount they want to
spend or the number of times an ad shall be displayed. Further, there are
more or less prominent positions of an ad on a website, there are overlapping
sets of keywords for which advertisers are bidding, and bids can be placed at
any time.
9See Evans 2008).
62.1 YouTube
In the Google/Youtube merger the FTC was mute. YouTube is a platform
that brings together users who watch or produce and display video clips.
YouTube’s service consists of hosting the videos on their web servers. The
users put on display videos on any topic they are interested in or they believe
that others may be interested in. Thereby, they reveal information about
their own hobbies, interests, and preferences. The viewers of the videos
reveal similar information by the selection of videos that they watch. This
information can be used in order to place search advertising on the webpage
where the video is displayed.10
To a large extent, the users of YouTube are certainly a subset of Google’s
users. People who are active on YouTube may use Google in order to search
for other or related information on the internet. Consequently, Google would
address the same users if it could identify them. It is not yet established
how to consider the effects of mulisided platforms in the definition of a rel-
evant market. Instruments like demand elasticities and critical loss analysis
are biased and only recent literature has addressed the question on how to
consider and eliminate this bias.11 By the searches that a user processes on
Google’s website they can infer who of them might be interested in User Gen-
erated Content (UGC). By the acquisition of YouTube Google gains direct
access to these users and can perfectly identify them. The merger eliminated
competition for the advertisers who were targeting users of UGC. Having in-
corporated YouTube this opened scope for a more thorough selection process
in applying search ads to specific groups of users. This effect will be reflected
in the model.
10In a research report from DoubleClick Bruner (2005) provides an overview on the
history and technology of search-based advertising.
11See Rochet and Tirole (2003), Evans and Noel (2008).
72.2 DoubleClick
DoubleClick sells ad serving, management and reporting technology to web-
site publishers, advertisers, and advertising agencies.12 This technology com-
prises ad serving tools that ensure that after ad space has been sold to an
advertiser the correct ad actually is shown on the website when it is displayed
to the user. DoubleClick holds patents on this technology. Google is an ad-
vertising platform and a typical customer of DoubleClick. For advertisers,
ad serving toos enable the advertisers to plan the campaign, deliver the ads,
analyze the results, and optimize the campaign.13
In the Google/DoubleClick merger the FTC refuted all doubts about an-
titrust concerns.14 Moreover, in their analysis they found no concerns by ad-
vertisers or publishers. Further they found out that Google and DoubleClick
were not direct competitors and that the ad serving market remains compet-
itive. First, there are several other provider of functionally similar software,
Second, DoubleClick’s technology would still be available to suppliers of ad
space because of the first argument, namley that Google had not sufficient
market power to tie DoubleClick’s ad service technology with its advertising
service. The FTC’s conclusion ”it is unlikely that the elimination of Google
as a potential competitor in the third party ad serving markets would have
a significant impact on competition.” is imprecise about the relevant market
in which competition is not impated.15
There is concern about privacy issues because both Google and Dou-
bleClick use user-related information in their business technology. Merging
both processes would allow to gain more precise and even personalized pro-
files on users. Consumer privacy protection was no obstacle for clearing the
merger and given the antitrust focus of the present analysis I do not further
investigate on this issue.
12See Commission Decision of 11/03/2008 on Case No COMP/M.4731 –
Google/DoubleClick.
13Baye et al (2008).
14See Baye et al. (2008).
15See Statement of the FTC concerning Google/DoubleClick FTC File No. 071-0170.
8The acquisition of DoubleClick provided to Google access to the necessary
technology in order to combine information gathered by the DoubleClick
technology and Google services in order to set up a more sophisticated and
fine-tuned allocation of ads to viewers. A superior ability than competitors in
targeting users will result in higher profits because this raises the advertisers’s
valuation for placing an ad. This effect is known as cream skimming in the
insurance literature.16 Clark and Riis (1998) present an analogous mechanism
where players have to decide on how to divide their effort when competing for
different prizes and the player’s valuations are heterogeneous. It turns out
that the player with the highest valuation ends up with the highest expected
payoff. With respect to the present case, I conjecture that this merger with
DoubleClick turned out to be more valuable after Google’s acquisition of
YouTube than before.
2.3 Yahoo!
Yahoo!’s portfolio of services is similar to Google’s portfolio. Internet search
and e-mail communication and social networks are the most prominent busi-
ness activities of Yahoo!.
Yahoo! is a major competitor in the market for internet advertising aim-
ing at users of search services. Search engines by Google and Yahoo are to
some extent substitutive services and a user may switch between the two ser-
vices, e.g. when he is not satisfied with the search results obtained from one
of the providers. Therefore, Yahoo and Google can offer the same eyeballs
to the advertisers and the advertisers can enforce price competition.
A merger between Google and Yahoo would have been blocked with a
high probability by the FTC or the European Commission. Because of the
deterrence effect of merger control, Google and Yahoo agreed upon trans-
fering the control over a share of Yahoo!’s advertising business rather than
taking over the entire business. Still implementing this agreement would have
constituted an antitrust violation because it would have eliminated competi-
16See Newhouse (1984).
9tion among firms on the same product market. Modifications to the original
agreement could not the regulator’s concerns. Overall the two firms would
jointly control 90 percent and 95 percent in the search advertising and the
search engine business, respectively. Google has an even more dominant po-
sition in Canada.17 Finally, Google and Yahoo! abandoned their advertising
agreement.18 Although this deal would have eliminated price competition
among Yahoo and Google to some extent, I conjecture that it shifts bargain-
ing power on the pricing of ads from advertisers and publishers to Google. I
demonstrate that the acquisition of YouTube by Google made the subsequent
deal with DoubleClick more profitable and that the agreement with Yahoo
would have allowed Google to fully benefit from the DoubleClick technology.
Moreover, consumers benefit from being offered services and products that
better match their needs and preferences. Although advertisers tended to
pay more for placing ads, the allocation would have been efficient and raises
no antitrust concerns.
DOJ hat announce to file antitrust actions against Google if they had
brought the agreement into effect. However, it is not clear whether a challenge
of the agreement would have been upheld. Although the market share of the
two firms exceeds 90 percent and the deal has an immediate potential to lessen
competition, the agreement does not constitute price fixing or establishing
a price floor. Further the agreement and the dominant position may be of
temporary nature. With a geographic market which is broader than the U.S.
and Canada, the existence of other search engines, and limited barriers to
entry, it is not clear which would be the relevant market, and, thus, what
would be the outcome of a legal dispute.
3 The Model
I consider a platform that brings together consumers and firms.
Consumers are of type i = A,B denoting the product they may be inter-
17See CBC (2008).
18See DOJ (2008).
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ested in. I normalize the number of consumers to one and s denotes the share
of A and 1− s the share of B. Throughout the paper I assume 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1.
This avoids distinction of cases, which would not provide additional insights.
s is common knowledge. Each consumer is hit by an ad exactly once.
Firms place advertisements on the platform and they are displayed to
consumers. Saving notation by denoting the two types of advertisers also as
A and B will not confuse. I assume that a firm i values an ad which hits a
user of type i with one and zero otherwise.
The platform cannot distinguish per se type A from type B users. It can
apply a sorting mechanism with cost C(a) = c/2 · a2 where a ∈ [0, 1] can be
interpreted as the accuracy of the mechanism. The platform separates the
users into two groups g = L,R of size s and 1−s, respectively. If accuracy is
zero, all users are mixed randomly over the two groups such that each group
is composed of a share s of A users and a share 1−s of B users. With perfect
accuracy L contains only A and R only B types. For intermediate values of
a table 1 indicates the number of users in each group by types.
Type / Group L R
A V AL = s+ (1− s)a V AR = s− sa
B V BL = 1− s− (1− s)a V BR = 1− s+ sa
Table 1: Types by Group
Modeling a as a purification mechanism of the two groups shifting type
A from group R to group L and vice versa ensures the nice property that
the overall value of the market remains constant. Imagine a ≤ 1 being an
upper bound for the platform’s choice of accuracy such that a > a may not
be technologically feasible, yet. The sorting technology may be subject to
further improvement which would raise a. Since each consumer can be hit
only once, the maximum revenue for the platform is one if each firm i = A,B
pays its full valuation for advertising to type i users and each type i is hit
by firm i’s ad.
The platform yields revenue from selling advertising space. The platform
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offers two packages: L and R, which can independently be bought by the two
firms. Let V gi denote firm i’s valuation for group g. The platform’s payoff
is a function of the firm’s valuation and it’s own bargaining ability η. In an
analogous way to a second-price auction, the firm with the highest valuation
will buy the advertising space for the group. The actual price will depend
on the platform’s bargaining abilities. The price will be at least as high
as the lower valuation and not exceed the higher valuation. η denotes the
share of the additional rent that the platform can extract from the winner,
i.e. the share of the difference between the first and the second valuation.
I will assume that the initial market structure, where the platform faces
competitors with similar services, e.g. internet search services by Yahoo, the
bargaining strength is weak (η < 1/2) and I allow it to become strong when
competition is eliminated (η > 1/2).
I further consider competition among platforms in a very stylized man-
ner. In the present model, platforms can only differ by their ability to identify
types of users. When the platform faces competition, I assume that the firms’
valuation and, consequently, the platform’s payoff depend on the platform’s
sorting accuracy. This reflects that consumers prefer ceteris paribus adver-
tising that better matches their interests and if they have the choice they will
choose the platform with better accuracy. For computational ease, I assume
that the payoff is proportional to a. A If there is no competing platform I
assume that consumers do not react upon the accuracy level.
Absent competition the payoff is
Π = min[V AL , V
B
L ] + η∆L︸ ︷︷ ︸
=PL
+ min[V AR , V
B
R ] + η∆R︸ ︷︷ ︸
=PR
− c
2
a2(1)
where
∆L =
∣∣∣[s+ (1− s)a]− [1− s− (1− s)a]∣∣∣
∆R =
∣∣∣[s− sa]− [1− s+ sa]∣∣∣.
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Inserting V gi yields
PL = 1− s− (1− s)a+ η(2s− 1 + 2(1− s)a)(2)
PR =
{
1− s+ sa+ η(2s− 1− 2sa) for a < 2s−1
2s
s− sa+ η(2s− 1 + s(1− s)a) for a ≥ 2s−1
2s
(3)
for the platform’s profit Π = PL + PR minus sorting costs.
When the platform faces competition the payoff is
ΠLR = PL · a+ PR · a− c
2
a2.(4)
This reflects the fact that a higher sorting accuracy allows to earn higher
profits, where a = 1 results in the payoff without competition because G
fully controls the sorting technology. Let the capital superscripts denote
the groups for which there is competition. Note that the platform may face
competition only for one group L or R if the competing platform is specialized
in a particular content.
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In the following sections I demonstrate how the presence of a competing
platform can affect consumer welfare. Further, I show that the acquisition
of the competing platform may be harmful and that obtaining control over
the sorting mechanism may be beneficial for consumers. Finally, raising the
bargaining power of the unique platform may be welfare increasing, too.
4 Acquiring a Competing Platform
Let C be a competing platform which attracts the same group of users R,
i.e. group R is visiting G and C, and B wants to hit each user only once.
YouTube brings together persons which are interested in UGC. I assume that
these consumers may be interested in advertising by firm B. This case covers
several alternative constellations, which comprise all cases that could arise if
these users were interested in firm A’s advertising as in Figure 2. Figure 1
shows the valuation functions V gi as indicated in Table 1 which is equivalent
to the payoff PR in (3) for η = 0 or η = 1.
Let V BC denote firm B’s valuation for the platform C’s users. Depending
on the number of B-users in this group V BC can lie in the segments I through
IV .
Result 1 If V BC lies in segment III an acquisition of C by the (dominant)
platform G will increase a when η < 0, s > 1/2, and c sufficiently small.
Proof: 0. Note that η < 1/2. 1. In order to sell, G must increase A’s or
B’s valuation above V BC . 2. G sets either a1 or a2. 3. If sorting is costly
G chooses a1. 4. Group L earns higher revenue for smaller a. 5. After
acquisition, G is a monopolist and sets a. 
The intuition is that G must offer a set of eyeballs that is more valuable
than the set offered by C. In segment III G has the choice of offering this set
to A or to B. Sorting a1 crowds out only few A eyeballs and this is preferable
than taking the more costly effort a2 and offering to B.
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In the cases I and II the presence of C has no effect on G’s choice of
a = a. V BC may lie in IV , such that G must set a3 in order to render R more
attractive to B: V BR > V
V
C . Then either G sells at price V
A
R because G and
C compete in prices (a` la Bertrand), or G sets a = 0 because sorting costs
are too high and revenue from L is higher for a = 0. Thus, the effect of a
competing platform of which the users are of high value for B is ambiguous.
5 Controlling the Sorting Technology
Result 2 When G owns the sorting technology, it is (i) unable or (ii) not
willing to sell it.
Proof: (i) Selling a < a is not possible because C anticipates that G chooses
a itself. Thus C’s profit would drop to zero. (ii) When selling a ≥ a G would
jeopardize its own revenue V BR (a) or reduce it below this level. A selling price
above V BR (a) would not be accepted by another platform. 
The platform G seeks control over the sorting mechanism in order to pre-
vent that another platform can offer a more valuable set of users. Moreover,
it will employ its sorting mechanism up to the maximally feasible accuracy
itself. The competing platform C would not benefit from purchasing and
applying this sorting mechanism because by assumption is has only a limited
number of B-users. Thus, it cannot offer a more attractive set of eyeballs.
The acquisition of DoubleClick helps Google in deterring other platforms to
sort their users up to an accuracy that makes advertising on other platforms
more attractive than on Google (and other platforms served by Google).
Under a non-horizontal merger assessment this acquisition would have
raised antitrust concerns because it aims at foreclosing access to a technol-
ogy. However, the efficiency defense would apply if the foreclosure of the
technology prevents competition of type III in the previous subsection. The
basis for this efficiency defense originates from the multi-sided property of a
platform. The platforms can enforce higher payments by the advertisers by
intensifying competition among the latter. This is done by offering groups of
17
more similar value. The platform which has the higher accuracy can offer the
more valuable set but price competition drives the revenue down to the value
of the competitor’s set. Therefore, in this constellation G may not be willing
to offer full accuracy. This externality harms consumers who face more mis-
placed ads and it cannot be internalized by the users. Therefore, a merger
that can prevent a constellation like type III is beneficial to consumers.
6 Bargaining Strength
Result 3 For η > 1/2 and c sufficiently small the platform chooses a = 1.
Proof: If G can extract the full valuation, it will set a such that the valuation
is maximized. This is profitable for c = 0 and c below some threshold. 
The agreement with Yahoo endows Google with increased bargaining
strength by the simple effect that advertisers have fewer options if they want
to hit users of search engines or any other sub-group which can be identified
by the behavioral sorting technology.19 In this case the consumers benefit
from the high accuracy of the sorting mechanism.
The agreement between Google and Yahoo! was under review by the
U.S. Department of Justice.20 Google and Yahoo were cooperating with DOJ
and explicitly provided time to investigate before making the arrangement
effective.21 Although the deal is no merger case, possibly the failing firm
defense may apply, but we will leave this aspect aside within this discussion.22
19See DOJ (2008).
20Note that Google withdrew from the agreement in order to prevent an antitrust lawsuit
from DOJ to prevent the deal. [Such a lawsuit] would have ended up also alleging that
Google had a monopoly [...]. See Schonfeld (2008a).
21See http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20080612 yahoo.html (October
31, 2008).
22A merger that is to be blocked under the merger guidelines may still be cleared if
bankruptcy of the target firm would be the alternative to the merger. Persson (2005) and
Fedele and Tognoni (2006) find that the failing firm defence is a beneficial instrument for
consumer welfare. In the present case it seems that Yahoo! is not a viable competitor in
the market anymore. Subsequent to the failure of this prevented deal with Google, which
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During the assessment by DOJ Google was providing arguments to waive
any antitrust concerns.23 Google claims that the deal ”Does not remove a
competitor from the playing field” and ”Does not let Google set prices for
advertisers” because ”An advertiser only bids what they think an ad is worth
to them”; Indeed ”Google does not manually set ad prices”.24 Still, the DOJ
considered the deal as a horizontal agreement between competitors and would
have filed enforcement actions, had Google not withdrawn the agreement.25
In this section I illuminate the fact that antitrust concerns go beyond a simple
allegation of price-fixing.
The generalized second-price auction allocates the prize to the bidder
with the highest valuation.26 This is a mechanism that implements price
discrimination which results in an efficient allocation. Under first degree
price discrimination27 the consumer rent is fully extracted by the seller.28
A simple example demonstrates that the pricing rule of an auction ensures
an efficient allocation but that the consumer rent is completely accrues to
the seller. The consumers welfare standard which is underlying the U.S. and
European Competition Policy do not support arrangements which aim at
this result.
The bidding mechanism employed by Google does not necessarily result
in an outcome which is critical from an antitrust perspective. This can be
demonstrated in a simple example: n bidders, which purchase one unit at
most, with equal valuation v face a seller with m products. For m > n each
buyer bids a minimal amount ε < v and an efficient outcome is reached.
Now, let the seller destroy some items such that m = n − 1. Consequently,
would have ensured a steady source of revenues, Yahoo! is loosing important executive
staff to its competitors.
See http://www.microsoft.com/Presspass/press/2008/dec08/12-04CorpDec4PR.mspx
(December 8, 2008).
23See http://www.google.com/yahoogooglefacts (October 31, 2008).
24See http://www.google.com/yahoogooglefacts (October 31, 2008).
25See DOJ (2008).
26See Edelman et al. (2008).
27Each buyer pays an amount equal to his valuation.
28Note that in the present case ’consumer rent’ refers to the rent of the advertisers,
which are the buyers.
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each buyer raises his bid up to v. Under the generalized second-price auction
n− 1 buyers obtain one item each, and one bidder goes away empty-handed.
Besides the elimination of some items, the allocation of the remaining item is
efficient. This example shows that the seller can set the market environment
such that he fully extracts the consumer rent - even though he employs an
efficient pricing rule where he is not actively setting the prices.
In the model only the sorting accuracy has an effect on final consumers.
The actual sorting mechanism has two crucial effects: Firstly, it divides up
all the users in different, possibly distinct, groups. This goes beyond the
two-tier classification of the model in section 3. This has not yet been ques-
tioned in a process of identification of relevant markets, but this mechanism
constitutes a differentiation of markets such that the advertising market is
separated into targets with different groups of users. Secondly, the sorting
mechanism determines how sellers are allocated to each of the markets. This
makes up the relative magnitude of m and n. The ability of controlling these
two parameters guarantees that Google can extract a large fraction of the
advertisers’ rent. This does not per se harm consumers.
This pricing policy aims at Google’s customers which are advertisers and
publishers. The advocacy of the consumer welfare standard in competition
policy aims at private consumers, who are not immediately affected by this
arrangement. Any critique on the distributional effects of the agreement are
not a basis for antitrust concerns. Moreover, the auction mechanism ensures
an efficient allocation of advertising space.
7 Conclusion
Google was involved in a series of deals, all of them in the online advertising
industry: two mergers with YouTube and DoubleClick and one attempted
arrangement with Yahoo!. Only the latter has been opposed by DOJ. The
present discussion uncovers arguments in favor of all of the three deals. How-
ever, balancing these benefits with the anticompetitive effects would be be-
yond the scope of the present analysis. Thus, they cannot serve as an ex post
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justification of the concentrations. Note also, that maximal concentration
may not be a harmful outcome on markets based on multi-sided platforms.29
I demonstrate that the merger Google/YouTube can have beneficial ef-
fects for consumers because the match between consumers and advertising
will be enhanced. This argument relies on the presumption that consumers
benefit more from having specific search ads displayed on their websites than
having unspecific advertisement. Since this merger has not been challenged
by antitrust authorities no relevant market has been identified, neither with
respect to the group of users, nor with respect to the advertising market.
Assuming that the degree of screening and classifying of the users is subject
to Google’s discretion, the merger eliminates one sort of incentives to not use
their search technology to the full extent. After the merger, Google can bet-
ter identify users of YouTube and match them with ads specifically designed
for users of UGC.
The merger with DoubleClick endows Google with control over the search
ad technology. Leaving aside concerns on consumer privacy, I identify pos-
itive effects from an enhanced searching and screening technology. Further,
this allows to make advancements in the screening technology. This becomes
particularly effective when Google is able to combine this technology with
more detailed information about the users’ geography, demography and surf-
ing habits on the internet. This concentration was subject to scrutiny by the
FTC and the European Commission.
The arrangement between Google and Yahoo! is double-edged. On the
one hand, focusing on the advertising market, which is immediately affected
by this deal, there is a negative effect. The advertisers face fewer suppliers
of ad space on websites visited by users of search engines. Again, it is not
clear whether this market definition is too narrow. However, we note that
although the rent is to a large extent transferred from the advertisers to the
platform, this comes along with an efficient allocation of ad space. On the
other hand, consumers benefit from the platform’s ability to fully employ its
search technology. After all the prevented harm from DOJ’s blocking of the
29See Evans (2002).
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deal may be jeopardized by Yahoo!’s possible cessation of business.
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